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Abstract. Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% 
of large transport aircraft fatal accidents. Yet, a well-trained and well-qualified 
pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an 
integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system. The latter 
statement, while generally accepted, cannot be verified because little or no quan-
titative data exists on how and how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew 
actions. A joint NASA/FAA high-fidelity motion-base human-in-the-loop test 
was conducted using a Level D certified Boeing 737-800 simulator to evaluate 
the pilot’s contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight opera-
tions and in response to aircraft system failures. To quantify the human’s contri-
bution, crew complement (two-crew, reduced crew, single pilot) was used as the 
independent variable in a between-subjects design. This paper details the crew’s 
actions, including decision-making, and responses while dealing with a hydraulic 
systems leak – one of 6 total non-normal events that were simulated in this ex-
periment. 
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1 Introduction 
Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large 
transport aircraft fatal accidents [1]. Yet, the Air Line Pilots Association says that “a 
well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of air-
craft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation 
system” [2]. The latter statement, while generally accepted, cannot be verified because 
little or no quantitative data exists on how and how many accidents/incidents are 
averted by crew actions. Anecdotal evidence suggests crews handle routine failures on 
a daily basis and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) data [3, 4] supports this as-
sertion but its data is not publicly releasable. Without hard data, the contribution and 
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methods employed by pilots to improve the safety of flight is difficult to define. Devel-
oping ways to augment and/or improve a pilot’s ability to contribute to flight safety is 
similarly ill-defined and is hard to characterize in the absence of quantifiable data.  
A joint NASA/FAA high-fidelity motion-base simulation experiment specifically 
addressed this void by collecting data to quantify the human (pilot) contribution to 
safety-of-flight and the methods used by pilots in today’s National Airspace System as 
they handled normal and non-normal conditions during typical revenue-like flight op-
erations. These data are fundamental to and critical for the design and development of 
future increasingly autonomous systems that can better support the human in the cock-
pit. Different crew complement configurations were tested to gain understanding of the 
safety afforded by having two crewmembers on the flight deck. Normal two-crew op-
erations were contrasted and compared to conditions where the second crew member 
was unavailable when the non-normal condition occurred but became re-engaged after 
returning to the flight deck and another case where only a single pilot was on the flight 
deck (i.e., simulating an incapacitated pilot). This paper details preliminary results and 
analysis of one of six non-normal events tested – a hydraulic leak in the System A 
reservoir. 
2 Methodology 
Crew complement (single pilot and crewed configurations) was experimentally ma-
nipulated during normal and increasingly challenging non-normal airline operations to 
quantify the pilot contribution to flight safety. 
2.1 Experiment Design 
The test objectives of the experiment were as follows: 
 Establish “baseline” levels of performance and safety with nominal two-crew 
configuration as well as collect data to assess the performance and safety decre-
ments in reduced crew and single pilot crew complements for present-day flight 
deck design and certification; and,  
 Identify technology requirements from these data for increasingly autonomous 
systems that might assist future two-crew operations and eventually, enable re-
duced crew or ultimately, single pilot operations.  
To assess human performance and safety, the experiment contrasted two-crew oper-
ations to conditions when one of the pilots was absent from the flight deck. If the con-
dition included a temporary absence, it was designated as reduced crew operations 
(RCO). If the condition included a permanent absence, it was designated as single pilot 
operations (SPO).  
The independent variables were crew complement and scenario. The three crew 
complement configurations were: Two-Crew, RCO, and SPO. Two normal scenarios 
and six non-normal scenarios were flown over the two days of data collection. The non-
normal scenarios were grouped into three categories (A, B, and C), with two non-nor-
mal runs in each category. Category A featured failures, initially unannunciated, with 
autopilot available; Category B featured annunciated failures with autopilot available; 
and, Category C featured annunciated failures with autopilot not available. Alert type 
and autopilot state were used to identify workload and automation issues (i.e., by avail-
ability of autopilot) and flight crew awareness and monitoring for normal / non-normal 
operations (i.e., alerting). All flights were flown to landing. 
Failures were triggered near top of climb or top of descent. This paper details one 
Category B failure - a loss of System A hydraulic system. Reference 5 provides a de-
tailed description of the experiment design (factors, metrics, and run matrix) and details 
one Category C failure.  
The data shown here is taken from 18 nominal Two-Crew runs, 18 nominal SPO 
runs, 6 nominal RCO runs (with the Captain resting), and 18 hydraulic leak non-normal 
runs (6 SPO, 6 RCO, 6 Two-Crew). For the RCO configuration, the non-normal started 
out with First Officer flying from the right seat and the Captain resting in the left seat, 
isolated in sight and sound from the cockpit. Two minutes after the flying pilot was 
alerted to the hydraulic failure, the resting pilot returned to flying duties in the cockpit. 
For the SPO configuration, each pilot flew from the left seat. 
2.2 Participants 
Thirty-six pilots (18 crews total), representing 5 airlines, participated in this experi-
ment. Each pilot held an Airline Transport Pilot rating and was current in the 737-800 
aircraft as either Captain or First Officer. All participants were male. Crews were paired 
by function (Captain or First Officer) and employer to minimize conflicts in training, 
standard operating procedures, and crew resource management techniques. Crews were 
instructed to bring their company’s paper and/or electronic charts and 737-800 check-
lists with them to further reduce conflicts in training and standard operating procedures.  
2.3 Simulator 
The research was conducted using the B-737-800 simulator operated by the FAA 
AFS-440 at Oklahoma City, OK. The simulator is Level D-certified and can be used 
for both initial and recurrent training. The simulator, although a Level D training de-
vice, is also fitted with experimental controls, modifications, and recording capability 
to support AFS-440’s research mission. The fidelity of the simulator and the recording 
capability were both critical to this research effort. 
The test was set-up to replicate a normal airline operation in today’s National Air-
space System. An air carrier flight from Denver (KDEN) to Albuquerque (KABQ) was 
used. Dispatch paperwork for the flight was provided to the crews and constituted the 
flight release.  
The simulated weather en-route contained significant areas of convective activity 
along the Rocky Mountain Front Range and strong Northerly winds that required a 
north departure out of KDEN before a circuitous route to the west and then south to 
KABQ. This same planned route of flight was used for the entire two days of data col-
lection. Weather and visibility were designed to affect any diversion decisions [5]. 
A live controller and pseudo-pilot(s) were tied into the simulation radio in real-time 
to simulate Air Traffic Control (ATC) and some proximate traffic to promote realism 
and maintain realistic pilot workload levels. A confederate also served as dispatcher in 
the Airline Operations Center and provided communications as necessary and appro-
priate when radioed. 
2.4 Training 
No additional training was conducted for the crews as they were qualified and cur-
rent B737-800 pilots and the simulator was Level D-certified. 
The crews were briefed on the purpose of the experiment and received the dispatch 
paperwork. The crews were instructed to use their company’s standard operating pro-
cedures and checklists for the entire test, including any company dispatch calls and 
cabin crew communications.  
Prior to boarding the aircraft, the crew reviewed the paperwork and discussed the 
flight plan and flight conduct. Once they boarded the aircraft, the crew did a familiari-
zation check and reviewed the simulator safety briefing. Known simulator-isms and 
aircraft differences were identified and discussed with the crew prior to run initiation.  
The aircraft initial condition was in the hold-short of Runway 35L at KDEN with the 
engines running, parking brake set. The Flight Management System (FMS) was pre-
loaded with the planned flight routing and the crews were asked to double check the 
entries. After review and confirmation of the cockpit switches/set-up and completing 
their normal checklists, the crew called KDEN tower for departure. 
Following clearance from ATC, the crew flew an entire nominal flight from KDEN 
to KABQ following the planned route of flight. The nominal flight served as a baseline 
for ‘normal’ airline two-crew operations (i.e., nominal data) to which the non-normal 
runs flown in the RCO and SPO configurations would be compared. The nominal flight 
also promoted familiarity for the two-person crew interaction during the approximately 
1.3 hours of flight time required for completion. This nominal flight was flown as the 
first run on Day 1 of data collection for each crew.  
3 Results 
The results shown here describe the major findings of only one of the Category B 
failure conditions, a System A hydraulics failure.  
The 737-800 has three hydraulic systems (A, B, and Standby) that operate inde-
pendently at 3000 psi. Each has a reservoir, pumps and filters. Either A or B Hydraulic 
System can power all flight controls with no decrease in airplane controllability. System 
A also provides hydraulics for landing gear, ground spoilers, alternate brakes, Engine 
1 thrust reverser, Autopilot A, normal nose wheel steering, and power transfer unit. 
System B provides hydraulics for leading edge flaps and slats, normal brakes, Engine 
2 thrust reverser, Autopilot B, alternate nose wheel steering, landing gear transfer unit, 
autoslats, yaw damper, and trailing edge flaps. The Standby System provides a third 
source for the rudder control system and a second source for thrust reversers and leading 
edge flaps and slats. 
The hydraulic leak failure was modeled as a large leak, at a rate of 10 gallons per 
minute, in the System A reservoir. When the reservoir quantity dropped to less than 
18.7% full, the System A hydraulics failure was annunciated to the flight crew through 
illumination of the: a) ENG 1 (engine-driven pump) and ELEC 2 (electric-motor-driven 
pump) LOW PRESSURE lights on the forward overhead hydraulic panel; and, b) Left 
and Right side MASTER CAUTION lights and HYD system annunciator light on the 
glare shield annunciation panel. Approximately 30 seconds later, the System A Flight 
Controls LOW PRESSURE light illuminated on the forward overhead flight control 
panel and the MASTER CAUTION lights and FLT system annunciator light illumi-
nated on the glare shield. Additionally, if the A side autopilot was engaged, it automat-
ically disconnected and the autopilot disconnect horn would sound. The B side autopilot 
was still available after the failure. If not shut down in time, approximately one minute 
after loss of hydraulic fluid cooling, the electric hydraulic pump OVERHEAT light 
would illuminate. This light would remain illuminated even after the pump had been 
shut down until the pump cooled down. Failure Handling and Flight Path Control 
For the hydraulic leak scenario, the failure occurred approximately 5 minutes prior 
to the top of descent during the cruise phase of flight at 36,000 ft mean sea level (MSL) 
while heading south toward KABQ.  
Once the failure occurred, 13 out of 18 pilots/crews declared an emergency with 
ATC. 11 pilots/crews requested special handling (holding pattern, vectors for descent 
from cruise altitude to a lower altitude, and vectors for long straight-in approach) from 
ATC. 
There were two single-pilot runs where diagnosing and attending to the System A 
hydraulic failure significantly affected the pilot’s airplane state awareness. These two 
single-pilot runs appear to be the only ones in the 18 hydraulic failure runs flown where 
dealing with the failure directly influenced the pilot’s aircraft awareness as summarized 
below: 
 SPO-Captain configuration run: Before the hydraulic leak occurred, the pilot was 
cleared to descend via the SANDIA3 arrival and a preselected altitude of 9,000 
feet was set to allow the aircraft to descend at the calculated top of descent. When 
the failure occurred, the aircraft had not yet reached top of descent and the pilot 
declared an emergency and requested a hold to have time to troubleshoot the 
problem before descending. The pilot was given vectors to a hold and engaged 
heading select and then flight level change, which placed the automation in au-
tothrottle arm mode and pitch on speed for the vertical mode. The pilot had in-
tended to select altitude hold. The pilot asked for and was given a clearance to 
slow down for the hold from 0.78 to 0.7 Mach and the speed reduction caused 
the aircraft to start a descent. After losing almost 2000 feet of altitude over 20 
seconds, the pilot realized his error and requested an altitude to hold from ATC. 
The pilot verbalized the altitude deviation during the run, but incorrectly thought 
this deviation was caused by putting the autothrottles in speed mode. Post-run, 
the pilot recognized his altitude excursion and said “I was convinced I was in a 
different mode and I descended through my altitude and didn’t start my hold 
because I was in heading select.” The pilot also commented post-run “I’m a little 
upset with myself here for that descent. I blew an altitude and even though I’m 
an emergency aircraft and all that. I really like to stay out of other people’s air-
space. I thought that was an objectionable excursion.” 
 SPO-First Officer configuration run: ATC cleared the pilot to descend via the 
SANDIA3 arrival to 9000 feet approximately 40 seconds after the pilot was 
alerted to the failure of the hydraulic system and the failed side autopilot discon-
nect horn sounded. The pilot silenced the horn, acknowledged the clearance, de-
clared an emergency, and set selected altitude to 9000 feet. Autothrottles were 
engaged and the flight directors were still providing lateral and vertical correc-
tions to the FMS-programmed path as the pilot proceeded to troubleshoot the 
failure. While handling the checklists and troubleshooting, the pilot was not ac-
tively hand-flying the aircraft, but it was well trimmed and continued to follow 
the flight path. When top of descent was reached, the automation retarded the 
throttle and the aircraft started a descent at the trimmed airspeed. This action did 
not violate the clearance but was not what the pilot was expecting as he did not 
actively engage a descent or follow the flight director commands once the auto-
mation began the descent. After almost ten minutes and a loss of 12,000 feet of 
altitude, the pilot finally re-engaged the autopilot to the non-failed side once he 
reached the note in the Loss of System A checklist that the autopilot B was avail-
able. Post-run, the pilot said “I was single pilot, had to unstrap myself, trying to 
put the gear down. Had nobody to fly the airplane or monitor the systems. I have 
to totally rely on the autopilot while I’m messing around with the checklists, 
trying to program. It’s a good thing I had at least one autopilot or it would have 
been a different situation.” 
3.1 Checklist Usage  
Time-to-first correct checklist was used as a metric for quick and proper trouble-
shooting of equipment problems. For the System A Hydraulic failure, it was an alerted 
failure with annunciation on the flight deck that had a direct entry in the Quick Refer-
ence Handbook (QRH) with the Loss of System A checklist.  
Crew complement was significant (F(2,15)=8.66, p=0.003) for time-to-start Loss Of 
System A checklist. Crews flying in the SPO or RCO configurations took approxi-
mately three times longer to start the correct checklist than those crews in the Two-
Crew configuration (see Fig. 1). [The boxplots show the median ratings, with the 25th 
and 75th percentile spread in the data; the maximum and minimum values; and mean 
ratings (connected by a line).] There were no significant differences between the SPO 
and RCO configurations for time-to-start Loss of System A checklist. Only in one of 
the six RCO crews who experienced this failure did the pilot flying (PF) start the Loss 
of System A checklist before the resting pilot returned to the flight deck. Recall that a 
fixed delay of two minutes was implemented in this experiment before the resting pilot 
could return to the flight deck once summoned by the PF. Taking that delay into account 
the average time-to-start the loss of System A checklist was similar for the Two-Crew 
and RCO configurations. In the SPO case, getting access to the QRH and locating the 
correct checklist was significantly delayed compared to the Two-Crew configuration. 
Initially, the SPO crew had to hand-fly the aircraft because the failure disconnected the 
autopilot.  
Time-to-complete the checklist was considered another indicator for safely handling 
failures. There were two checklists, the Loss of System A and Manual Gear Extension, 
to execute for the System A hydraulic failure. The time-to-complete metric for the Loss 
of System A checklist included time to execute all checklist items up to the deferred 
items in the Descent, Approach, Manual Gear Extension, and Before Landing check-
lists. The items in the descent, approach and before landing checklists varied by airline 
carrier, but were similar in their content. The manual gear extension checklist was the 
same for all carriers; so, the time-to-complete metric included all of the items in this 
checklist. 
 
Fig. 1. Boxplot of Time to Start the Loss of System A Checklist after Hydraulic Failure 
Loss of System A checklist: Crew complement was not significant (F(2,15)=0.95, 
p=0.410) for time-to-complete the Loss of System A checklist. The SPO configuration 
had the most variation for this measure as the single pilot had to simultaneously main-
tain aircraft control, read/execute the checklist items, communicate with ATC/dispatch, 
and gather weather information (See Figure 2). The overall mean time for the crews to 
complete the checklist was 3.3 minutes. 
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Fig. 2. Boxplot of Time Required to Complete Loss of System A Checklist 
Manual Gear Extension Checklist. Crew complement was not significant 
(F(2,15)=0.77, p=0.482) for time-to-complete the Manual Gear Extension checklist. 
The SPO configuration had the most variation for this measure as the single pilot had 
to simultaneusly maintain aicraft control, read/execture checklist items, and manually 
lower the landing gear (See Fig. 3). The overall mean time for the pilots to complete 
the checklist was 1.8 minutes. 
 
Fig. 3. Boxplot of Time Required to Complete Manual Gear Extension Checklist 
The number of checklist items missed was another measure of failure handling. In 
18 hydraulic failure runs, only 2 crews missed checklist items for the Loss of System 
A checklist. One RCO crew (with Captain resting during cruise) missed two items 
(turning Standby Rudder On and turning Off Hydraulic Pumps) because the First Of-
ficer did not indicate where in the checklist the resting pilot (Captain) should begin. 
The First Officer had the checklist out in his lap and the Captain concurred it was a 
Loss of System A hydraulic failure and started with the inoperative items in the check-
list. The consequence of not turning the pumps off was the electric pump would con-
tinue to overheat and either burn the motor out or start a fire. Not turning standby rudder 
on would mean that only System B would be providing hydraulic power to the rudder. 
One First Officer flying in the SPO configuration missed the checklist item of turning 
the nose wheel steering switch to alternate. Additionally, one Captain flying in the SPO 
configuration missed one item, putting the landing gear lever in the down position, 
while completing the Manual Gear Extension checklist. This omission caused a GPWS 
aural warning during landing.  
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3.2 Diversion Decision 
The test was staged to evaluate decision-making by the flight crew. A diversion de-
cision after a failure was part of this decision-making test which tasked the pilots to 
consider distance to fly with the failure, the weather at each airport (KABQ and possible 
divert airports), and the time it took to troubleshoot the problem. Another factor that 
played specifically in the pilot’s decision-making process for a System A hydraulic 
failure was that once the landing gear was manually lowered it could not be retracted 
which could make landing at an alternate airport impossible.  
The reality is that when the hydraulic failure happened close to the top of descent, 
the best option was to continue a landing to the destination at KABQ. For the System 
A hydraulic failure, all crews, regardless of crew configuration, continued to the desti-
nation and landed safely. Santa Fe was the alternate airport for the flight but even 
though it was in the direct flight path, it had the same weather as Albuquerque, a shorter 
runway, and would require a steeper descent rate or ATC vectoring on a flight path that 
would be the same distance as going to the destination. Since Albuquerque, the desti-
nation airport, was only an additional 60 miles with better support facilities and the 
Flight Management System was already configured for flight to KABQ, Santa Fe was 
not considered a better alternative by any crews for the hydraulic failure runs. 
3.3 Workload 
The NASA TLX captured a subjective rating (0 [Low] to 100 [High]) of perceived 
task load. There are six subscales of workload represented in the NASA TLX: mental 
demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration level 
[6]. The overall score results of this measure were examined to investigate task load 
variation. 
Independent analyses revealed no significant (p>0.05) differences between the nom-
inal runs and hydraulic failure runs for either the PF or pilot monitoring (PM) TLX 
ratings. For the hydraulic failure runs, pilots rated their overall workload as being low 
to moderate, as reflected in the PF (median rating=38) and PM (median rating=26) TLX 
ratings.  
There were no significant (p>0.05) PF workload differences for crew complement. 
Single pilot operations were rated as having moderate workload, while crewed opera-
tions were rated as having low to moderate workload (see Fig. 4). 
3.4 Safety-of-Flight 
Perceived level of safety was self-assessed using a Likert type scale from 1-7, where 
1 was completely acceptable and 7 was completely unacceptable.  
An ANOVA revealed significant differences (F(1,34)=7.78, p=0.009) between the 
nominal runs and hydraulic failure runs for PF Perceived Safety of Flight ratings. Figure 
5 illustrates these differences, where from an overall perceived level of safety for the 
PF compared to normal flight, this failure was difficult for some pilots as indicated by 
the large spread in data. Figure 6 shows the PF rating for each crew complement con-
figuration. Pilots viewed the safety of this failure as unacceptable during single pilot 
operations (median rating=5.0) where the pilot had to simultaneously maintain 
flightpath control, communicate with ATC/Dispatch, perform checklists, and eventu-
ally manually lower the landing gear. PF ratings indicated safety of flight was accepta-
ble for this failure when there were two pilots to attend to it. 
 
Fig. 4. Overall TLX Ratings for PF Hydraulic Failure Runs by Crew Configuration. 
 
Fig. 5. Perceived Safety of Flight Ratings for Pilot Flying Nominal and Hydraulic System Fail-
ure Runs Collapsed Across Crew Configuration. 
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 Fig. 6. Perceived Safety of Flight Ratings for Pilot-Flying Hydraulic System Failure Runs by 
Crew Configuration. 
4 Conclusions 
This paper reflects the analysis for one non-normal scenario out of six evaluated, a 
hydraulic system failure, and it supports the conclusion that anything less than two crew 
members will require significant redesign of automation and increased levels of auto-
mation support. Time for a single pilot to troubleshoot and attend to failure of a primary 
hydraulic system increased three-fold and safety of flight was compromised. Workload 
increased to moderate levels during single pilot operations. The hydraulic failure oc-
curred right before top of descent and initially caused the autopilot to disconnect. Two 
crews while flying single pilot lost airplane state awareness during the initial high work-
load phase of communicating the problem to ATC, finding the pertinent pages in the 
quick reference handbook, and trying to hand fly while configuring the aircraft. While 
not critical for this failure, loss of altitude awareness can quickly become catastrophic 
without the cross-check of a second pilot. 
A potential latent failure was observed in the resting pilot re-engagement. The shared 
event of watching the failure develop, when cautions and warnings are observed, and 
the fact that the cautions are already reset before the resting pilot returns to the flight 
deck limits the shared knowledge of the resting pilot. Additionally, if the pilot flying 
has already opened the checklists and does not explicitly state what has already been 
done, the shared knowledge is further degraded. A resting Captain assumed that the 
First Officer had completed the checklist and concentrated on inoperative items without 
verifying correct aircraft configuration and missed a number of checklist items. Al-
though mostly benign in this failure, the safety margins were decreased for the rest of 
the flight since some of the flight control redundancy was missing. 
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This failure occurred near top-of-descent; diversion to an alternate airport was not 
necessary. Workload and performance may have been optimistic considering the loca-
tion of the failure. 
Data analysis of the nominal runs and six failure runs is being used to establish quan-
titative baseline levels of performance and flight safety during nominal two-crew oper-
ations. This nominal data are being used to assess performance and safety decrement in 
reduced crew or single pilot operations using current-day flight deck design and certi-
fication. The nominal data are also being employed to identify and develop new appli-
cations and technology requirements for increasingly autonomous systems to assist pi-
lots during dynamic and unplanned situations and perhaps future operations with two-
crew, reduced crew, or possibly commercial single pilot operations.   
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